Epistemic Conditions for Rationalizability*
by
Eduardo Zambrano*
University of Notre Dame
First version: December, 1999
This version: August, 2005

*

I would like to thank session participants at the 2001 Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society,

the 2000 World Congress of the Game Theory Society, the Spring 2000 Midwest Economic Theory
Conference and at seminars at the University of California at Irvine and the University of Notre
Dame, and especially two anonymous referees for their valuable comments on this project. All
remaining shortcomings are mine.
*

Department of Finance, Mendoza College of Business, University of Notre Dame, South Bend,

IN 46556. Phone: (574) 631-4597. Fax: (574) 631-5255. E-mail: ezambran@nd.edu.

1

Abstract

In this paper I show that, just as with Nash Equilibrium, there are sparse conditions,
not involving common knowledge of rationality, that lead to (correlated) rationalizability. The basic observation is that, if the actual world belongs to a set of states
where the set Z of action pro…les is played, each player knows her own payo¤, everyone is rational and it is mutual knowledge that the action pro…les played are in Z,
then the actions played at the actual world are rationalizable actions. Alternatively,
if at the actual world the support of the conjecture of player i is Di , there is mutual
knowledge of: (i) the game being played, (ii) that the players are rational, and (iii)
that for every i the support of the conjecture of player i is contained in Di , then every
strategy in the support of the conjectures is rationalizable. The results do not require
common knowledge of anything, are valid for games with any number of players, and
extend to re…nements of rationalizability such as independent rationalizability and
rationalizable conjectural equilibrium.
Keywords: Rationalizability, common knowledge, interactive epistemology.
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1

Introduction

Ever since its inception, rationalizability has been a concept intimately linked to the
idea of the rationality of the players being commonly known. This intuition has been
captured in Bernheim (1984, 1986), Pearce (1984), Brandenburger and Dekel (1987),
and Tan and Werlang (1988). In this paper I show that, just as with Nash Equilibrium,
there are sparse conditions, not involving common knowledge of rationality, that lead
to (correlated) rationalizability. Indeed, the results do not require common knowledge
of anything, and are valid for games with any number of players.
The stage is set by the following Preliminary Observation for Rationalizability:
Fix a game g, let Z be a (Cartesian) set of action pro…les and let e
S be a set of states

where only-and-all the pro…les in Z are played. If at every state in e
S the actual game
is g, everyone is rational and it is mutually known that an action pro…le in Z is played,
then the actual action pro…le at each state in e
S is rationalizable for g.

e and since the action
Indeed, since every action in Zi arises at some state in S;

chosen at each state is in Zi ; then each action in Zi is a best response to beliefs whose
support is contained in Z i ; so by de…nition, the actions chosen at any state in Se are
rationalizable actions.1

The reader will note that this observation is analogous to the Preliminary Ob1

For a formal statement of this result, together with full proof, see Section 4.
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servation [for Nash Equilibrium] identi…ed in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995).2
I exploit greatly the fact that this analogy exists, and present my results closely
following the style of Aumann and Brandenburger’s seminal work.
Though simple, the Preliminary Observation for Rationalizability is not without
interest. Note that it calls for mutual knowledge of the set of choices, with no need
for any higher order knowledge. In particular, it does not call for common knowledge.
For rationality and for the payo¤ functions, not even mutual knowledge is needed; only
that the players are in fact rational, and that each knows his own payo¤ function.
In recent years a view has emerged that advocates interpreting solution concepts
as eminently imposing restrictions on beliefs, rather than on the actions actually
played.3 This is the context of my second result, which provides su¢ cient conditions
for a product of supports of conjectures to constitute a set of pro…les of rationalizable
actions.
It is again a result akin to theorem in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) (Theorem A) that which leads to rationalizability of beliefs. And, again, common knowledge
plays no role. Here the conjecture of each is a probability distribution on the other’s
actions. One then has the following theorem: Suppose that at the current state of
2

Indeed, if the collection S contains only one state, the strategies chosen at S constitute a Nash

equilibrium and the two Preliminary Observations coincide.
3

See Harsanyi (1973), Armbruster and Boege (1979), Aumann (1987), Tan and Werlang (1988),

Brandenburger and Dekel (1989) and Nyarko (1998) among others.
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the world the support of the conjecture of every player i is D i . Suppose that at that
state there is mutual knowledge of: (i) the game being played, (ii) that the players are
rational, and (iii) that for every i the support of player i’s conjecture is contained in
D i . Then the actions that arise with positive probability under the player’s conjectures
are rationalizable action pro…les. This is Theorem AB in the paper.
It is worth noting here that this result holds for games with any …nite number
of players. This is in contraposition to Theorem A in Aumann and Brandenburger
(1995) which holds only for two-player games. They handle the n player case in
their Theorem B, but to do this they require a common prior and common knowledge
of conjectures, in addition to mutual knowledge of payo¤s and of rationality. Those
extra assumptions are not required in the present work.
When one advocates the interpretation of equilibrium as equilibrium in beliefs
one is compelled to seek for the implications over observed play that follow from the
beliefs being in equilibrium.4 With this in mind I present, as a corollary to Theorem
AB, a result that states that under the same hypothesis of Theorem AB not only the
supports of conjectures are rationalizable at a state, but the actions chosen at that
state are rationalizable as well.
The rest of this paper is aimed at presenting a coherent formulation and proof of
the claims made above. In Section 2 I present the formal statement of the results and
4

This view is prominently held by Jordan (1996) and Nyarko (1994).
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their proofs. In Section 3 I discuss the results.

2

The Results

In what follows I follow closely the standard notation and de…nitions as presented
in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995).5 Let a game form G be given, that is, a
…nite set N of players, together with a …nite set of actions Ai for each player i. Set
A :=

i2N Ai :

A model of G is de…ned to consist of

1. for each player i, a set Si of types
and for each type si of i
2. a probability measure on the set S
other players, where S

i

i

:=

j6=i Sj

of (n

1)-tuples of types of the

is endowed with the product structure (si ’s theory),

3. an action ai (si ) of i; and
4. a function gi (si ) : A ! <,
Set S :=

i2N Si ;

and call the members s = (s1 ; :::; sn ) of S states. The set S is

also endowed with the product structure. An event is a measurable subset E of S.
De…ne an extension p ( ; si ) on S as follows: if E is an event, de…ne p (E; si ) to be the
probability that si ’s theory assigns to fs
5

i

2S

i

: (si ; s i ) 2 Eg : For all i, functions

For excellent surveys of the literature see Dekel and Gul (1997), Geanakoplos (1993); and Bati-

galli and Bonanno (1999).
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p ( ; si ), ai (si ) and gi (si ) are all assumed to be measurable as a function of the type
si . I also assume that player type si assigns probability 1 to i being of type si . For
a discussion on these assumptions, check the excellent discussion section in Aumann
and Brandenburger (1995).
The interpretation of the model described above is that the type si of player i
chooses action ai (si ) ; has a payo¤ function of gi (si ) ; and has probabilistic beliefs
on S at state s = (s1 ; :::; sn ) given by p ( ; si ) : I write a (s) for (a1 (s1 ) ; : : : ; an (sn )) ;
g (s) for (g1 (s1 ) ; : : : ; gn (sn )) and call g (s) the game played at s: Given a game g, a
model of g is simply a model of the game form associated with g.
Set A

i

:=

conjecture
(

1;

2; : : : ;

i

j6=i Aj :

A conjecture

i

of i is a probability distribution on A i . The

(s) of i at s is given by the marginal of p ( ; si ) on A i : I write

for

n) :

Player i is called rational at s if his action at s maximizes the expectation of his
payo¤ at s when the other player’s actions are distributed according to his conjecture
at s:
If x is a function on S and X is a subset of its range, then [x 2 X] denotes the
event fs : x (s) 2 Xg : If Se is a subset of S then A Se denotes the action pro…les
n
o
e
e
e
chosen at S; that is, A S = a 2 A : a (s) = a for some s in S : If E is an event
de…ne the operator Ki on events by

Ki (E) = fs : p (E; si ) = 1g :
7

As in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), knowledge is identi…ed with probability
one belief, so Ki (E) is the event that player i knows E. Set K (E) = \i2N Ki (E) :
I will denote a point mass probability distribution on s by 1s and a probability
distribution q on a set fs1 ; : : : ; sn g by q1 s1 +

+ qn s n :

The version of rationalizability that I work with in this paper allows each player
to believe that his opponents’s actions are correlated.
A set

i2N Zi

A of action pro…les has the best response property if, for each

player i 2 N; every action ai 2 Zi is a best response to a belief qi of player i whose
support is a subset of Z i .
An action ai 2 Ai is rationalizable if there is a set

i2N Zi

with the best response

property such that ai 2 Zi . The set of pro…les of rationalizable actions is, therefore,
the union over all the sets of action pro…les that have the best response property.

2.1

An Illustration

Consider a model in which all types of each player i have the same payo¤ function
gi as depicted in Figure 2.1. Thus the game being played is known at every state.
The information structure of the model is depicted in Figure 2.2. Each row denotes
a state, and contains the actions chosen by the players at that state, as well as the
beliefs held by the players. For example, at state s1 Ann chooses C; her beliefs are
given by 21 s1 + 21 s2 ; whereas Bob chooses c and his beliefs are given by 13 s1 + 13 s4 + 13 s7 :
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Notice that the actions chosen at s1 are best responses to the players conjectures at
s1 , that this pro…le belongs to the set fC; Dg

fc; dg; and that the support of the

player’s conjectures at s1 are precisely fc; dg and fC; Dg: Hence, by de…nition, the
actions played at s1 are rationalizable actions.

Bob
c
Ann

d

e

C

3; 3 0; 0

1; 1

D

0; 0 1; 1

0; 1

Figure 2.1
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Ann’s Belief
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s
2
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c
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C
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s
2

+ 21 s2

d

s3

C

1s3

e
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D

1 4
s
4

+ 43 s5

c

s5

D

1 4
s
4

+ 43 s5

d

s6

D

1s6

e

s7

D

1 7
s
3

+ 13 s8 + 13 s9

c

s8

D

1 7
s
3

+ 13 s8 + 13 s9

d

1s8

s9

D

1 7
s
3

+ 13 s8 + 13 s9

e

1s9

States

1 1
s
3

+ 13 s4 + 31 s7
1 2
s
4

+ 43 s5
1s3

1 1
s
3

+ 13 s4 + 31 s7
1 2
s
4

+ 43 s5
1s6

1 1
s
3

+ 13 s4 + 31 s7

Figure 2.2
This is an instance of the Preliminary Observation for Rationalizability. State
s1 is contained in the set fs1 ; s2 ; s4 ; s5 g: At every state in this set both players are
rational, the set of action pro…les chosen at those states is fC; Dg
is mutual knowledge that the actions chosen is in fC; Dg
common knowledge that the actions chosen at s1 are in fC; Dg

fc; dg and it

fc; dg: But it is not
fc; dg. Though Ann

knows that Bob chooses in fc; dg, she does not know that he knows this; indeed, she
considers possible that he considers possible that she considers possible that he will
play e. Moreover, though both players are rational at s1 ; there is not even mutual
10

knowledge of rationality there: at that state Bob considers possible that the true
state is s7 , where Ann chooses D with an expected payo¤ of 31 ; rather than C, with
an expected payo¤ of 43 ; thus Ann is irrational at s7 :
This example also serves to illustrate the content of Theorem AB. At state s2 the
support of Ann’s conjecture is {c,d}, the support of Bob’s conjecture is {C,D}. It is
also mutually known at s2 that: (a) both players are rational, and (b) the support
of Ann’s conjecture is contaned in {c,d} while the support of Bob’s conjecture is
contained in {C,D}. Indeed, these supports contain only rationalizable actions and, as
the corollary to Theorem AB dictates, the actions chosen at s2 are also rationalizable.

2.2

Theorems, Proofs

I now state and prove the main results of the paper formally.
Preliminary Observation for Rationalizability: Fix g and Z

A: Let e
S

be a set of states where only-and-all the pro…les in Z are played, that is Z=A Se : If

at every state in Se the actual game is g, everyone is rational and it is mutually known
that a 2 Z then

i2N Zi

is a set of action pro…les with the best response property and

the actions chosen at every state in Se are rationalizable for g.

Proof. Need to show that any action ai in Zi maximizes the expectation of gi

given a conjecture whose support is a subset of Z i . Pick ai in Zi : Then there is
a state s in Se such that ai (s) = ai : At such state s player i maximizes his payo¤
11

function gi with respect to his conjecture

i

(s) : Since [a 2 Z] is mutual knowledge

at s we have that p ([a 2 Z] ; si ) = 1: Therefore, supp
i2N Zi

i

(s)

Z i : This shows that

e By de…nition,
has the best response property. Now pick any state s0 in S.

a (s0 ) 2 Z and hence the actions chosen at every state in Se are rationalizable for g.
Theorem AB: Let D := (Di )i2N with Di

A

i

be an n tuple of supports of

conjectures. Let Dij be the projection of Dj on Ai . Suppose that at some state s
supp

(s) = D; it is mutually known that payo¤ functions are g; that the players are

rational, and that for every player i supp
about i to be Ci := [j6=i Dij : Then

i2N Ci

i

Di : De…ne the distributed conjecture
is a set of action pro…les with the best

response property and, therefore, a set of rationalizable action pro…les of g.
Proof. Need to show that any action ai in Ci maximizes gi with respect to a
conjecture whose support is a subset of C i . Pick ai in Ci and hence in Dij for some
j. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.2 in Aumann and Brandenburger
(1995). By assumption, supp

j

(s) = Dj : So j attributes positive probability at s

to [ai = ai ]. Also, j attributes probability 1 at s to the following events: i’s payo¤
function is gi ; i is rational, and i’s conjecture has support contained in Di : So there
is a state t at which all four events obtain: i’s action is ai ; i’s payo¤ function is gi ; i
is rational, and i’s conjecture has support contained in Di : By de…nition, Dji
Di

C

i

Cj ; so

and ai maximizes gi with respect to a conjecture whose support is a subset

12

of C i :
Lemma L: If

i2N Ei

is a set of pro…les of strategies with the best response property

and ai is a best response to a belief with support contained in E i , then ai is a
rationalizable action.
Proof. If ai is in Ei there is nothing to prove. If this is not the case consider the
set

0
j2N Ej

where Ei0 = Ei [ fai g and Ej0 = Ej0 for j 6= i. To see that

0
j2N Ej

has

the best response property pick an action aj in Ej0 : If aj = ai then, by hypothesis,
aj is a best response to a belief with support contained in E

j

and therefore in E 0 j :

If aj 6= ai then aj is in Ej and hence it is a best response to a belief with support
contained in E

j

and therefore in E 0 j : This means that ai is a rationalizable action

since, by construction, ai is in Ei0 :
Corollary 1 Under the same hypotheses of Theorem AB the actions chosen by the
players at s are rationalizable.

Proof. Under the hypotheses of Theorem AB the set

i2N Ci

has the best response

property. Since each player i is rational at s the action ai (s) is a best response to
a belief with support contained in Di ;which is, by construction, contained in C i :
Hence, by Lemma L, action ai (s) is rationalizable for every player i in N .

13

3

Discussion

a. The Conventional Wisdom. The purpose of this paper is not to argue that the
conventional characterizations of rationalizability that rely heavily on common knowledge assumptions are wrong or inadequate; it is simply to point out that alternative
characterizations, that do not require common knowledge of anything, are available.6
This is important to point out because the conventional wisdom leads us too quickly
into thinking that there is no natural model of rationalizability other than the one
based on common knowledge assumptions.7
6

To wit: literature surveys (such as Dekel and Gul, 1997, and Battigalli and Bonanno, 1999)

present only characterizations of rationalizability that depend on common knowledge assumptions.
Therefore, to the extent that characterizations of rationalizability that do not require common knowledge assumptions were viewed as important by these authors, these results were largely unavailable
at the time they wrote their surveys.
7

For example, Brandenburger (1992) suggested that characterizations of Nash equilibrium that do

not assume common knowledge of anything seem surprising because “common knowledge plays a role
in [justifying correlated rationalizability]” (p.90). Binmore (1990), in turn, wrote: “To sustain the
conclusion that nothing can be said about a game beyond the fact that a ‘rationalizable’strategy will
be played, one needs an explanation of how it comes about that the player’s utilities are commonly
known, but nothing whatever is known about their beliefs” (p. 4). Milgrom and Roberts (1991)
wrote: “models of learning in games (...) where the players can use only information about past play
are (...) in contrast with (...) approaches [such as] rationalizability [in that] they allow weight to be
placed only on payo¤ information” (p. 85). Fundenberg and Tirole (1991) explain that “subjective
correlated equilibrium is less restrictive than rationalizability [because it] allows each player’s belief
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It is also not my purpose to suggest that the conditions that lead to rationalizability in the present paper are particularly weaker than the traditional conditions based
on common knowledge assumptions. While the assumption of common knowledge is
untenable in many situations,8 assumptions such as mutual knowledge of actions, payo¤s, and conjectures are di¢ cult to justify, too. Indeed, it is interesting to note that
rationalizability can be characterized exactly by using an assumption about what the
players know about the actions chosen by others because it was precisely a deep insatisfaction with this “rational expectations”assumption that led to the development of
rationalizability.9 This fact suggests that the restrictions imposed by rationalizability,
while weaker, are not unlike those imposed by Nash and are, therefore, “equilibriumlike.” Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) reached a similar conclusion in a di¤erent
setup.
b. Interpretation of the Preliminary Observation for Rationalizability. So far in
the epistemic literature there have been two kinds of results. In the …rst kind of
results, sometimes called “local” results, one makes assumptions about what is true
about his opponents to be completely arbitrary, and thus cannot capture the restrictions implied by
common knowledge of the payo¤s” (p. 60).

8

As seen, for example, in Fagin et. al. (1995).

9

Despite the similarity between the assumptions it is clear that the assumption that players know

that the actions chosen belong to some set Z (to which they truly belong to) is much weaker than
assuming that they actually know the exact action pro…le chosen.
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regarding the player´s knowledge, belief, rationality, etc. at a given state of the world,
and then veri…es what might be true, for example, regarding the actions chosen by the
players, at that state. The second kind of results, sometimes called “global results,”
answer questions about what kind of inference an outside observer can make about
the kinds of actions that are chosen across the entire state space based on what the
observer knows to be true regarding the player´s knowledge, belief, rationality, etc.
at every state of the world. While Theorem AB is clearly a result of the …rst kind, the
Preliminary Observation for Rationalizability appears to be of a third type altogether,
as it neither …xes an individual state, nor takes an outside observer perspective. The
Preliminary Observation appears to have features of both perspectives.
Indeed, I believe that to give an appropriate interpretation to the Preliminary
Observation it is useful to adopt a third perspective: one in which there is an observer
to the strategic interaction at hand distinct from the players of the game, but an
observer whose knowledge and belief about the game is formalized the same way one
formalizes the knowledge and the beliefs of the players. I call this the inside observer
perspective. Here is a way to adapt this perspective to generate a “local” version of
the Preliminary Observation for Rationalizability.
A model of G with observer is simply a model of G where each state also speci…es
beliefs for the inside observer, that is, a probability measure over the set
Theorem IO: Fix g and Z

j2N Sj :

A: Suppose that at some state s the support of
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the inside observer’s conjecture over the actions of the players is Z. Suppose further
that the inside observer knows at s that: payo¤ functions are g, that the players are
rational, and that it is mutual knowledge among the players that a 2 Z: Then the
inside observer knows that a rationalizable action pro…le is chosen at s.
The proof of this result closely follows the proof of Theorem AB and I omit it
here.
Notice that the knowledge of the inside observer is modelled in the same way as
the knowledge of the players. Notice also that what the inside observer knows and
what the players know need not coincide.
The inside observer perspective can be useful for generating results when it may
be important to make precise the distinctions between what the participants in a
social interaction know and believe, and what an observer di¤erent from the players
(but part of their environment nevertheless) can know and believe. This can be of
use as we, game theorists, are part of the very world we are trying to understand.
Despite this, we often do not model ourselves as players in that world because there
are typically weak strategic links between us and the strategic interactions we study.
We do, however, share a similar cognitive representation of the world as the players
in the social interactions we study and sometimes it may then be of value to formally
represent what we know (be it the same or not as what the players know and believe),
in the same language that we use to represent what the players know and believe.

17

Adopting the inside observer perspective allows us precisely to do this and the present
paper shows that this perspective may yield fresh insights into otherwise well studied
game theoretic concepts.
c. Converses. While the epistemic conditions for rationalizability identi…ed in this
paper are not necessary, there is a sense in which the converses to the results presented
in this paper hold: Given a game g there is a model of g such that the conditions
are ful…lled. Choose a model with a state space S identi…ed with the largest set Z of
strategy pro…les with the best response property where the payo¤s are the same at
every state, the beliefs at each state are such that players choices at that state are
rational and have support in Z, and players’knowledge is derived from their beliefs
at each state. In particular, every such set Z has at least one strategy pro…le z that
consists of strategies that are not weakly dominated for either player. Have the belief
of every player i have full support on Z

i

at the state s corresponding to pro…le

z. It may then be veri…ed that the conditions of the Preliminary Observation for
Rationalizability are met for S and the conditions for Theorem AB are met at state
s.
d. Independent rationalizability. The notion of rationalizability developed by
Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) did not allow for correlated conjectures, that is,
for beliefs such that knowing about the actions chosen by some players would convey
information about the actions to be taken by other players. One may naturally wonder
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whether characterizations of such notion of independent rationalizability exist along
the lines of the ones developed in this paper for (correlated) rationalizability.
The answer to this question is a “quali…ed yes.” Characterizations that do not
assume common knowledge of anything do exist, although they do require an explicit
assumption of the conjectures of the players being independent.
Preliminary Observation for Independent Rationalizability: In addition to the assumptions in the Preliminary Observation for Rationalizability, assume
that at every state in Se the conjecture of each player i about each other player j

are independent of i’s conjecture about all other players. Then

i2N Zi

is a set of

independent rationalizable action pro…les for g.
Theorem AB for Independent Rationalizability: In addition to the assumptions in Theorem AB, assume that it is mutual knowledge at s that the conjecture
of each player i about each other player j are independent of i’s conjecture about all
other players. Then

i2N Ci

is a set of independent rationalizable action pro…les for

g.
The explicit assumption of independence of conjectures make these result of somewhat limited interest in light of the subjectivist context in which the interactive epistemology literature is currently being developed. It is, nevertheless, important to
recall that the standard characterization of independent rationalizability in terms of
common knowledge assumptions does requires common knowledge of this indepen-
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dence (as well as common knowledge of rationality and payo¤s).10 This means that
both the Preliminary Observation and Theorem AB for independent rationalizability
are still of interest relative to the well known characterization in terms of common
knowledge.
A …nal remark on independent conjectures is in order. One may wonder whether
assuming independence can be avoided altogether. I have investigated two routes to
providing an answer to this question. First, there is the possibility that independence can be obtained along the lines of Theorem B in Aumann and Brandenburger
(1995), who derive independent (and identical) conjectures out of assuming a common
prior and common knowledge of conjectures. One may then conjecture that common
knowledge of supports of the conjectures, or common knowledge of supports plus a
common prior may lead to the conjectures to be independent (albeit not necessarily
identical).
This turns out not to be the case. To see this consider a three player game where
A1 = fC; Dg ; A2 = fL; Rg and A3 = fW; Eg ; with conjectures at each state induced
by the common prior in Figure 3.1. Each type is denoted by the same letter as its
action, and a subscript is added.
10

See e.g., Tan and Werlang (1988).
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L1

R1

U1

1
8

1
8

D1

1
8

1
16

L1

R1

U1

1
8

1
16

D1

1
8

1
4

W1

E1

Figure 3.1
In this example the support of the conjecture of every player about the other two
players is the same at every state of the world, hence the supports of the conjectures
are common knowledge among the players. Conjectures themseves, however, are not
common knowledge at any state; they are not even mutual knowledge at any state.
And, in fact, conjectures are not independent at any state.
So nothing less than a common prior plus common knowledge of the conjectures
themselves seems to be required for conjectures to be independent. But these assumptions, together with mutual knowledge of rationality and payo¤s characterize
Nash equilibrium, not independent rationalizability.
Another route to avoid assuming independence directly is to identify necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for independence, such as the ones implied by the work of
Geiger, Meek and Sturmfels (2006) for the study of graphical models and Bayesian
networks. The conditions would entail assuming that the support of the conjectures
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have a product structure and verifying that the conjectures, for every player i; are
such that

a

X

ua

i

va

i

log

i

(a i ; si ) = 0;

i 2A i

whenever
X

ak 2A

and ua

i

and va

i

fi;jg

u aj ak

vaj ak = 0 for all j 6= i; all aj 2 Aj

are arbitrary integers. I …nd those conditions not easier to motivate

that independence itself.
To conclude: it seems di¢ cult to dispense with the independence assumptions in
a characterization of independent rationalizability. Despite this, common knowledge
of this independence, or rationality, or payo¤s, are not necessary to characterize
independent rationalizability as was previously believed.
e. Robustness of the Results. The results presented above are robust to weakening
mutual knowledge to almost mutual 1 belief.11 To state this version of the results
recall that an event E is q believed by player i at s when p (E; si )

q and almost 1

belief by player i at s if it is q believed by player i at s for q close to one. Now the
results:
Robust Preliminary Observation for Rationalizability: Fix g and
Z
11

A: Let e
S be a set of states where only-and-all the pro…les in Z are played, that is

These robustness results are inspired in Proposition 9 in Dekel and Gul (1997), a robustness

check of whether common knowledge of rationality leads to rationalizability.
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Z=A Se :Given a model of g there is a q 2 (0; 1) such that if at every state in e
S the

actual game is g, everyone is rational and it is mutual q-belief for q>q that a 2 Z;
then

i2N Zi

is a set of action pro…les with the best response property and the actions

chosen at e
S are rationalizable for g.

Robust Theorem AB: Let g be a game and D := (Di )i2N with Di

A

i

be

an n tuple of supports of conjectures. Let Dij be the projection of Dj on Ai : De…ne
the distributed conjecture about i to be Ci := [j6=i Dij :
Given a model of g there is a q 2 (0; 1) such that if at some state s supp

(s) = D;

it is a mutual q-belief for q>q that payo¤ functions are g; that the players are rational,
and that for every i supp

i

Di ; then

i2N Ci

is a set of action pro…les with the

best response property and, therefore, a set of rationalizable action pro…les of g.
The proofs of these results closely follow the proofs of the original results and I
omit them here.
f. Weakly dominated strategies. Games without weakly dominated strategies allow
for a simpler version of Theorem AB. It can be veri…ed that all that is needed for a
characterization of rationalizability at a given state is mutual knowledge of rationality,
of payo¤s, and of the support of the conjectures of the players. I omit the details
here.
g. Learning, Evolution and Rationalizability. A basic result from the literature
on learning in games is that adaptive learning leads to rationalizability (Milgrom and
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Roberts, 1991).12 Gul (1996), who independently developed results similar to those
in Milgrom and Roberts (1991), interprets these results as providing examples of
learning models where “rationality becomes common knowledge”. This is, in general,
viewed as surprising since adaptive learners know nothing about the rationality or
the payo¤s of others despite the strong link that exists between rationalizability and
common knowledge of both rationality and payo¤s. Results of this sort are often used
to emphasize how the learning theoretic approach can “substitute for high levels of
knowledge and deductive powers on the part of individuals”13 and therefore provide
better foundations for rationalizability than the epistemic approach.
It is my belief that, in light of the results presented in the present paper, a di¤erent
interpretation of the seminal results by Milgrom and Roberts (1991) and Gul (1996)
is required. One can view these results as hinting at the existence of simpler epistemic
conditions for rationalizability, that do not require common knowledge of anything.
With the bene…t of hindsight, they clearly point to the content of the Preliminary
Observation for Rationalizability: after a su¢ ciently long time, adaptive learners play
a near best reply to their beliefs, which are correctly speci…ed in the sense that they
12

Adaptive learning takes place when each player “eventually chooses only strategies that are

nearly best replies to some probability distribution over his competitors’joint strategies, where near
zero probability is assigned to strategies that have not been played for a su¢ ciently long time.”
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1991, p. 85).
13

Young (1998, p. 112).
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place probability near one to strategies that arise from all players choosing, in fact,
only near best replies to their beliefs. This says nothing, whatever, about whether
players learn anything about the rationality of others, since these adaptive models
are silent about what the players may know or learn about payo¤s. Consequently,
the interpretation of Proposition 9 in Gul (1996) (i.e., that rationality becomes common knowledge because only rationalizable strategies will eventually be played in the
adaptive learning model) needs to be reexamined.14
h. Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1994) developed a solution concept intended to capture the steady state of recurring play of
a game. Such solution concept, termed rationalizable conjectural equilibrium (RCE),
corresponds loosely to strategy pro…les such that (a) players best respond given their
conjectures, (b) their conjectures are not contradicted by the pro…le chosen, and (c)
conditions (a) and (b), together with the structure of the game and the monitoring technology, are common knowledge among the players. Interestingly, the set of
RCE contains the set of Nash equilibria, and it is contained in the set of correlated
rationalizable strategies.
Just as with the notion of rationalizability, RCE has been a concept intimately
linked to the idea of the rationality of the players and of the structure of the game
being commonly known. This intuition has been captured in Rubinstein and Wolinsky
14

See also Young (1998, p. 112).
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(1994) and Battigalli (1999). Below I show that, just as with Nash Equilibrium
and rationalizability, there are sparse conditions not involving common knowledge of
anything that lead to RCE.
To do this I need to introduce some additional notation. A game for Rubinstein
and Wolinsky (1994) speci…es, apart from payo¤s, strategies and players, signal functions

i

: A ! Ti for each player i. The interpretation is that element ti =

i

(a)

is the signal that player i privately observes when all player choose the actions that
make up the pro…le a. Pro…le a is a rationalizable conjectural equilibrium if for each
player j there is a set Bj

Aj

Tj such that, for all i, (ai ;

(aj ; tj ) in Bj is such that aj is a best response to a belief

j

i

(a )) 2 Bi and every

with support contained

in
(i) a

j

:

(ii) fa

j

: 8k 6= j (ak ;

j

(aj ; a j ) = tj ;and
k

(aj ; a j )) 2 Bk g :

In a RCE “each player’s action is optimal, given a player’s conjecture about what
the other players’actions will be. The player’s conjecture has to be consistent with the
signal that he has on the actions the others intend to take, with the knowledge of his
own action and with the knowledge that the other players follow similar reasoning.”15
In what follows a game form G is obtained from adding to game form G a signal
function
15

i

for each player i.

Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1994, p. 302).
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A model of game form G is a model of G where each state s also speci…es the signal
i

is

(a (s)) that each player i receives at that state. As before, player i’s conjecture at s
i

(s) : The conjecture of i is con…rmed at s if player i only puts positive probability

at s on actions for the opponents that would generate the signal received by player
i given player i’s choice at s; namely, if every element in the support of
contained in fa

i

:

i

(ai (si ) ; a i ) =

i

i

(s) is

(a (s))g :
A:Let e
S be a set of states

Preliminary Observation for RCE: Fix g and Z

where only-and-all the pro…les in Z are played, that is Z=A Se . If at every state

s in e
S the actual game is g, everyone is rational, the conjectures of the players are
con…rmed and it is mutually known that a 2 Z: Then the action pro…le chosen at s
is a RCE for g.
aj (s0 ) ;

Proof. For each player j let Bj =
since s is in S, (ai (s) ;

i

j

(a (s0 )) : s0 2 SZ : Therefore,

(a (s))) 2 Bi for every player i. Now pick (aj ; tj ) in Bj :

By de…nition, action aj is chosen at some state s0 in S where
sequently, aj is a best response to belief
are con…rmed at s0 ; the support of
remains to show that for all a
case that (ak ;

k

j

j

j

j

(a (s0 )) = tj : Con-

(s0 ) : Since the conjectures of the players

(s0 ) is contained in a

in the support of

j

j

:

j

(aj ; a j ) = tj . It

(s0 ) and for all k 6= j it is the

(aj ; a j )) 2 Bk : Since [a 2 Z] is mutual knowledge at s0 we have that

p ([a 2 Z] ; s0i ) = 1: Consequently, for any a
such that a

j

(s00 ) = a

j

j

in supp

j

(s0 ) there is a state s00 in e
S

and aj (s00 ) = aj (s0 ) : Since s00 is in e
S; this means that for
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k 6= j; (ak (s00 ) ;

k

(aj (s0 ) ; a

j

(s00 ))) 2 Bk :

Theorem AB for RCE: Let D := (Di )i2N with Di

A

i

be an n tuple of

supports of conjectures. Let Dij be the projection of Dj on Ai :
Suppose that at some state s supp

(s) = D; it is mutually known that payo¤

functions are g; that the players are rational, that the conjectures are con…rmed and
that for every i supp

i

Di : Then the action pro…le chosen at s is a RCE for g.

The proof of this result is very similar to the proofs constructed above and I omit
it here.
i. Extensions. In this paper I have shown that there are epistemic conditions
for rationalizability that do not assume common knowledge of anything, that these
conditions are robust, and that they extend to re…nements of rationalizability such as
independent rationalizability and rationalizable conjectural equilibrium. These results
lead us naturally to ask whether the same can be said about notions of rationalizability
for games in extensive form (Pearce, 1984; Dekel, Fudenberg and Levine, 1999), and
for games with incomplete information (Battigalli, 2003). These extensions are left
for future work.
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